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KEY TO TERMS, INDIVIDUALS, AND ABBREVIATIONS
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Appellant Annie C. Porcello, now deceased
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Deed of trust on Hayden Lake house
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Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage Company
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Mortgage of $480,000 on Woodinville house issued by Evergreen

Hayden Lake house

House located in Hayden Lake, Idaho
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Respondent Jennifer Porcello (now Maggard), ex-wife of Mark

Joe Mijich

Annie and Tony’s attorney

Kalyn

Personal representative of Annie and Tony’s estates, daughter of
Mark, and granddaughter of Annie and Tony

Kim Parker

Joe Mijich’s paralegal

Legacy Group

Legacy Group Capital, LLC

Legacy Group loan

Short-term loan of $648,500 issued by Legacy Group

Mark

Respondent Mark Porcello, son of Annie and Tony, father of
Kalyn, and ex-husband of Jennifer

Note

Promissory note in the amount of $648,500, plus interest

Second Evergreen loan

Mortgage of $417,000 on Via Venito house issued by Evergreen

Tony

Appellant Anthony J. Porcello, now deceased

Via Venito house

House located in Indian Wells, California

Woodinville house

House located in Woodinville, Washington
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INTRODUCTION

I.

This appeal concerns the interpretation and construction of a promissory note for

$648,500 (the Note) and a deed 0f trust that secured the Note (the Deed 0f Trust) and future
advances. Respondents

Mark Porcello (Mark) and

Jennifer Porcello (Jennifer) needed

$3 12,044.32 t0 purchase a house in Hayden Lake, Idaho (the Hayden Lake house) and asked

Mark’s parents, Annie (Annie) and Anthony Porcello (Tony),

if they

could borrow the money.

Annie and Tony agreed but did not have the money themselves. T0 provide the money Mark and
Jennifer needed, Annie and

Tony took

out a short-term, high-interest loan from Legacy Group

Capital (Legacy Group) for $648,500 (the

Legacy Group

loan).

The Legacy Group loan was $648,500 because Annie and Tony had

to leverage the

equity they held in two houses, a house in Woodinville, Washington (the Woodinville house) and

a house in Indian Wells, California (the Via Venito house), and that required paying off the

mortgage 0n the Woodinville house. The Via Venito house had no mortgage. Thus the Legacy

Group loan included $3 12,044.32
(the

(the

money needed for the Hayden Lake

house), $270,462.50

payoff for the mortgage 0n the Woodinville house), $48,677.62 (Which according to Mark,

he received), and $17,3 1 5.50
Jennifer,

(in settlement charges).

Annie and Tony required them

Legacy Group loan due

Hayden Lake house

Mark and

t0

Before releasing $3 12,044.32 to

t0 sign the Note,

which was drafted

t0

Mark and

be identical t0 the

Annie and Tony’s exposure, and the Deed 0f Trust, Which pledged the

as security for the

Jennifer signed the

Note and future advances.

Note and Deed 0f Trust and purchased the Hayden Lake

house With $3 12,044.32 loaned from Annie and Tony. But they never repaid Annie and Tony

any portion of the Note, not the $312,044.32, not the $270,462.50 used to pay off the mortgage
on the Woodinville house, not the $48,677.62 that Mark received, not the $17,315.50 in
settlement charges, and not the interest and other fees on the Legacy Group loan Annie and Tony
eventually paid or subsequent advances they made to Mark. The reason, according to Mark and
Jennifer, is that Annie and Tony’s attorney (Joe Mijich) informed them they would own the
Hayden Lake house “free and clear” once the Woodinville house sold and the Legacy Group
loan was repaid. The Note and Deed of Trust contain no such terms.
Annie and Tony eventually repaid the Legacy Group loan, the Woodinville house
eventually sold, and the district court interpreted the Note and Deed of Trust to mean that Mark
and Jennifer now own the Hayden Lake house free and clear. That was error. It is fundamental
that an unambiguous contract must be interpreted and construed according to the plain meaning
of its terms and that an ambiguity only arises if a particular term is reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretation. The district court ignored those rules when it found the Note and Deed
of Trust were latently ambiguous and used extrinsic evidence to add entirely new terms that vary
and contradict the plain terms of the contracts.
Mark and Jennifer contend the district court was correct and justified in considering
extrinsic evidence, not only because the Note and Deed of Trust were latently ambiguous but
because the contracts were unintegrated and procured by Annie and Tony’s fraud. Mark and
Jennifer are wrong. The district court did not consider and made no findings that the Note and
Deed of Trust were unintegrated or induced by fraud. Under the guise of interpreting the Note
and Deed of Trust to determine the parties’ intent, the district court found the contracts were
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latently ambiguous and did so without identifying any language that was unclear. And on that
basis, and that basis alone, the district court used extrinsic evidence, not to explain what was
intended by an unclear term, but to add terms that the contracts do not contain.
The district court also erred in other ways. Substantial and competent evidence does not
support the district court’s conclusion that the parties meant for Mark and Jennifer to take the
Hayden Lake house free and clear once the Woodinville house sold and the Legacy Group loan
was repaid. Mark and Jennifer offer different explanations for why the evidence supports that
conclusion, but neither account for the district court’s finding that Annie and Tony were entitled
to their equity in the Woodinville house after it sold, which amounted to at least $220,000. The
record does not support the conclusion that Annie and Tony meant to gift their equity in the
Woodinville house, thousands of dollars in loan fees, and subsequent advances to Mark and
Jennifer so they could own the Hayden Lake house free and clear. Such a result is implausible.
Annie and Tony ask the Court to reverse the district court, vacate the judgment, and
remand for the district court to apply the Note and Deed of Trust as written, to find Mark and
Jennifer were in default under the Note, and decide what amount is owed to Annie and Tony.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mark makes several factual statements that are not supported by the record. First, Mark’s
statement that “Jennifer and Mark questioned why the note was for $648,500 before signing” is
not fully true. See Mark’s Br. at 8. While Jennifer questioned the amount of the Note before
signing, Mark did not. On September 3, 2014, Mark signed the Note and the Deed of Trust, but
Jennifer did not. COE 504 (Ex. 8); COE 609 (Ex. F); COE 610-614 (Ex. G); Tr. 164:1-19
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(Mark); Tr. 536: 12-24 (Jennifer).1 According to their testimony, only after Jennifer refused to
sign did

Mark

48 1 :7-19

Joe Mijich regarding the amount of the Note. Tr. 165125-166119 (Mark);

call

(Jennifer). Jennifer signed the contracts the next day,

(EX. F), 613 (Ex. F), 688 (EX. U).

on September 4. See

COE 609

Thus Mark signed the contracts before questioning the Note.

Second, Mark’s statement that “the Woodinville house sold for $690,000 and the sale
proceeds were distributed to

Mark’s Brief at
the

9.

Legacy Group

so that he could pay off the

While the Woodinville house sold
loan.

Legacy Group loan
First

Mark

By the time the house

sold,

t0 $193,398. 12 with proceeds

Evergreen loan).

COE

534-537 (EX.

14); Tr.

Legacy loan”

for $690,000,

is

also not true. See

none of its proceeds paid off

Annie and Tony had already paid down the

from a new $480,000 loan 0n the house
180:22-181:10 (Mark);

COE

(the

115:17-1 16:21

(Rerucha Dep.). In mid-July 2015, Annie and Tony paid the remainder of the Legacy Group

loan—by that time, $198,020.17—with
Via Venito house

(the

Two weeks

a portion of the proceeds from a $417,000 loan on the

Second Evergreen

later,

loan).

COE 712

the Woodinville house sold. See

proceeds went to pay off the Legacy Group loan because
proceeds went t0 sales commissions and other fees

(just

(EX.

AA);

COE 731
it

Tr. 18 1 :21-18424 (Mark).

(EX.

NN). None 0f those

was already paid.

Rather, the

under $49,000), paid off the

First

Evergreen loan ($483,957.00), and were advanced to Mark for the purchase 0f a property in
Bellevue, Washington ($157,157.40) in connection With the Second Evergreen loan.

COE 732-

“g”
Annie and Tony’s opening brief, the Clerk’s Record on Appeal is cited as
The exhibits and deposition transcripts offered at trial are included in the Certiﬁcate of Exhibits,
Which is cited as “COE.” A11 cites t0 COE are t0 the Certiﬁcate of Exhibits page number. The
Transcript 0n Appeal is cited as “ﬂ”
1

As

in

733 (Ex. NN); COE 716 (Ex. EE); Tr. 204:18-205:2 (Mark); Tr. 768:21-770:9, 785:12-787:3,
860:11-861:19 (Tony); Tr. 1201:24-1204:12, 1207:19-1209:6 (Kalyn). No part of the proceeds
from the Woodinville house sale were given to Mark so he could pay off the Legacy Group loan.
Third, Mark’s statement that “[t]he outstanding Evergreen loan for $417,000 refinanced
the entire debt owed under the promissory note secured by the deed of trust on the Hayden
home” is not correct. The Second Evergreen loan was unrelated to the Hayden Lake house; he
needed the money to purchase the Bellevue property. Tr. 181:21-183:3, 413:9-414:10, 1486:1423 (Mark). But the Woodinville house did not sell in time, and as a condition on Annie and Tony
obtaining the Second Evergreen loan, their debts were paid first. Tr. 183:20-184:4 (Mark). That
is why the Second Evergreen loan inadvertently paid off the last of the Legacy Group loan
($198,020.17), along with the mortgage on Annie and Tony’s personal residence ($49,499.07),
their credit card ($7,883), and a credit card held by Mark that Annie had cosigned. Tr. 183:14184:9, 241:9-243:18 (Mark); COE 538 (Ex. 15); COE 711 (Ex. AA).
Because the Second Evergreen loan was tied to Mark’s purchase of the Bellevue
property, Annie and Tony advanced the remainder of the proceeds ($116,494) to Mark, plus
$52,382.07 for paying off their mortgage and credit card. Tr. 188:21-189:6, 191:17-192:5, 241:9244:18 (Mark); COE 616 (Ex. O); COE 617 (Ex. P). For that same reason, they advanced Mark
the $157,157.40 from the Woodinville house sale. Tr. 204:18-206:8, 314:1-16 (Mark). Mark
used all of that money for the Bellevue property. See COE 615 (Ex. N); COE 711 (Ex. AA).
Thus, Mark’s claim that the Second Evergreen loan refinanced his and Jennifer’s debt on the
Hayden Lake house is not correct.
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III. REPLY ARGUMENT
A.

The district court erred in finding the Note and Deed of Trust were latently
ambiguous and in considering extrinsic evidence to interpret the contracts to
include entirely new terms.
When a contract’s language is unambiguous, the contract must be construed by the

meaning derived from its plain wording. Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 454, 259
P.3d 595, 600 (2011). Whether an ambiguity exists and the interpretation of the contract if it is
not are both questions of law for the Court. Id. at 455, 259 P.3d at 601. The district court erred in
finding a latent ambiguity in the Note and Deed of Trust and in interpreting the contracts to
include entirely new terms. While Mark and Jennifer argue otherwise, it is impossible to ignore
that the district court failed to identify any particular term that was ambiguous. Instead the
district court found a latent ambiguity because it did not understand why the parties entered into
the contracts—i.e., the contracts “do not make sense”—not because extrinsic evidence was
needed to explain the meaning of any uncertain language. R. 471-77.
1.

The district court’s judgment against Annie and Tony is based on a false
premise: that the Note and Deed of Trust contain a latent ambiguity.
a.

Before a court can find a latent ambiguity, the contract must contain
a particular term that is reasonably susceptible to conflicting
interpretation or is nonsensical.

The district court found the Note and Deed of Trust were latently ambiguous “because
the principal amount due under the Note is more than double the amount Mark and Jennifer
needed to purchase the subject property.” R. 472. That, according to the district court, “do[es]
not make sense.” Id. From there, the district court sought to interpret the contracts and
considered “extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent at the time the Note and Deed of
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Trust were signed.” Id. That was error because, as Annie and Tony explained in their opening
brief (at pp. 27-31), no term of the contracts was in fact susceptible to a reasonable conflicting
interpretation. While purporting to interpret the contracts, the district court did not identify—or
attempt to explain the meaning of—any uncertain term. See R. 471-477.
Defending the district court’s legal analysis, Mark and Jennifer seemingly recognize the
district court’s failure, as they each contend there was no need to find a particular term
ambiguous before finding the Note and Deed of Trust contained a latent ambiguity. Mark’s Br. at
12-13; Jennifer’s Br. at 8-11. According to Mark, Idaho decisions have not “required a particular
‘term’ with multiple reasonable meanings before finding a latent ambiguity.” Mark’s Br. at 12.
Jennifer agrees: “a latent ambiguity need not only be based on the existence of a term in the
contract that is susceptible [to] more than one reasonable meaning.” Jennifer’s Br. at 11. Their
contention is inconsistent with Idaho case law and defies basic principles of contractual
interpretation and construction.
The courts’ primary objective in interpreting a written agreement “is to discover the
mutual intent of the parties at the time the contract is made,” and the “parties’ intent should be
ascertained from the contract’s language.” Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc. v. Summerwind Partners,
LLC, 157 Idaho 600, 610, 338 P.3d 1204, 1214 (2014) (citation omitted). Thus, when
interpreting a contract, the courts “‘begin[] with the document’s language.’” Knipe Land, 151
Idaho at 454, 259 P.3d at 600 (citation omitted). “For a contract term to be ambiguous, there
must be at least two different reasonable interpretations of the term, or it must be nonsensical.”
Swanson v. Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 (2007) (citations omitted). A
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latent ambiguity, while not clear on the face of the contract, “becomes apparent when applying
the instrument to the facts as they exist.” Id. (citation omitted).
Thus the contract must contain some term or language that is “reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretation” before a court can find it ambiguous. Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993,
997, 829 P.2d 1342, 1346 (1992). That is true whether the ambiguity is patent or latent, as shown
by cases Annie and Tony cited in their opening brief (at pp. 27-31). In Snoderly v. Bower, 30
Idaho 484, 166 P. 265, 265-66 (1917), a contract term that required hay to be measured
“according to government rule” was latently ambiguous because there were several such rules. In
Williams v. Idaho Potato Starch Co., 73 Idaho 13, 20, 245 P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (1952), the
reference to “a ten inch pump” in a well drilling contract was latently ambiguous because there
were at least three possible pumps. And in Cool v. Mountainview Landowners Cooperative
Association, 139 Idaho 770, 772, 86 P.3d 484, 486 (2004), the term “swimming” in a written
easement was latently ambiguous because interpreting it strictly would lead to an illogical result.
In each of those decisions, actual language in the contract was unclear when applied to
the facts of the case. To be sure, the entire point of resolving the ambiguity in “government rule,”
“a ten inch pump,” and “swimming” was to explain the meaning of uncertain language and the
parties’ intent. That was not the case here as the district court failed to identify or explain any
uncertain term of the Note or Deed of Trust. See R. 471-477.
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b.

In Porter and Canyon Highway District No. 4, the Court found an
ambiguity tied to a particular term.

It follows that “conflicting interpretations as to ‘why the principal amount of the Note
and Deed of Trust were more than double the amount needed to purchase the Hayden home,’”
Mark’s Brief at 12-13 (citing R. 473), do not justify finding the contracts are latently ambiguous.
The ambiguity must be tied to a particular term that is reasonably susceptible to another meaning
and requires explanation when applied to the facts as they exist. No Idaho case cited by Mark
and Jennifer, or otherwise found, allows a court to find a latent ambiguity untethered to the
contract’s actual language and its application to the existing facts. That includes Porter v.
Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 195 P.3d 1212 (2008), cited by Mark, and Canyon Highway District No.
4 v. Canyon County, 107 Idaho 995, 695 P.2d 380 (1985), cited by Jennifer.
According to Mark, citing Porter, unidentified “inconsistencies in the Note and Deed of
Trust throw[] a ‘shadow of ambiguity’ over the instruments,” requiring the introduction of parol
evidence to determine the parties’ intent. Mark’s Br. at 13. But the shadow in Porter was cast by
actual language in a deed that could have been interpreted multiple ways. See 146 Idaho at 40405, 195 P.3d at 1217-18. In particular, the Court found the deed was ambiguous because “the
phrase ‘meanderings of the hollow’ could be interpreted to mean a line either at the center of the
hollow or following the sinuosities of the hollow from the SE to the NW corners.” Id. at 405, 195
P.3d at 1218. That is in contrast to the district court here, which identified no such ambiguity.
Canyon Highway District No. 4 also included specific language that was ambiguous,
albeit in a statute. Yet according to Jennifer, the decision recognizes that a latent ambiguity can
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arise simply because a contractual relationship itself is “nonsensical” or does not make sense,
thereby freeing the district court from identifying and explaining a term that is unclear. See
Jennifer’s Brief at 9-11. The principle that a contract term is ambiguous if its language is
“nonsensical” derives from Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 443, 65 P.3d 184
(2003). See Swanson, 145 Idaho at 62, 175 P.3d at 751 (citing Purdy). In Purdy, the Court sought
to interpret an insurance policy and observed in a footnote that a “policy provision could be
ambiguous if there were no reasonable interpretations.” 138 Idaho at 447 n.1, 65 P.3d at 188 n.1.
An example of such language is found in Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154
Idaho 259, 297 P.3d 222 (2012). In Steel Farms, a landlord and tenant entered into a written
agreement granting the tenant a lease and option to purchase a farm. But while the agreement
expressly granted the tenant the option to purchase the farm, strict application of its plain
language left the tenant with no opportunity to actually exercise the option. Id. at 266, 297 P.3d
at 229. The Court found the plain language of the conflicting provisions was “nonsensical” and
that parol evidence was necessary to determine the parties’ intent. Id.
Canyon Highway District No. 4 does not involve nonsensical language but sought to
explain what the legislature meant by a “taxing district” that received money in 1979. There
voters approved a change in how a county’s secondary roads were administered, resulting in a
highway district replacing a county department. 107 Idaho at 996, 695 P.2d at 381. The change
was complicated by a statute that directed how sales tax proceeds returned to the county should
be distributed to taxing districts: each taxing district’s share was based on the amount distributed
“for the fourth calendar quarter of 1979.” Id. at 997, 695 P.2d at 382. The statute also required
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that the “resulting sums shall be paid to the county treasurer of each county for distribution to
each taxing district … which received sales tax moneys in 1979.” Id.
The county claimed the highway district was not eligible to receive the department’s
apportionment of sales tax monies, since the highway district was created in 1981 and was not a
taxing district in 1979. Id. The highway district sued, and the district court found it was a taxing
district entitled to the apportionment of sales tax monies even though the language of the statute
appeared unambiguous on its face. Id. There was, according to the district court, a latent
ambiguity in the statute regarding exactly what the legislature intended when the plain language
was applied to the facts. Id. The district court found the highway district was entitled to a share
of the sales tax money as a taxing district in 1979, just as the department would have been,
because extrinsic evidence showed the reorganization “merely resulted in a change of
administration of an ongoing governmental function.” Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court agreed that the highway district was a taxing district eligible
for the distribution of the tax sales money: “[t]he more reasonable interpretation is that the sales
tax money should follow the responsibility.” Id. Thus, just as Snoderly, Williams, and Cool did,
Canyon Highway District No. 4 gave meaning to specific language that was unclear and that
required explanation when applied to the facts of the case. Canyon Highway District No. 4 does
not support Jennifer’s contention that a latent ambiguity can arise without language that is
reasonably susceptible to another meaning or simply because the contractual arrangment itself
does not make sense. See Jennifer’s Brief at 11.
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c.

The circumstances here are akin to Knipe Land, where there was no
latent ambiguity, not Cool, where there was a latent ambiguity.

In their opening brief (at pp. 30-31), Annie and Tony contrasted the holdings in decisions
such as Cool, which found a latent ambiguity, with the holding in Knipe Land, which did not. In
Knipe Land, a property broker and a landowner entered into an employment contract to sell the
land. 151 Idaho at 452-53, 259 P.3d at 598-99. The contract included a provision that, in effect,
allowed the broker to earn twice as much under a failed sale of the land than in a successful sale.
See id. at 456, 259 P.3d at 602. The Court rejected the district court’s implicit finding that such a
seemingly absurd and unfair result created a latent ambiguity. Id. The circumstances here are
analogous to Knipe Land, not Cool.
Mark and Jennifer fail to address or distinguish the merits of Knipe Land. They simply
argue the decision has no application because the district court here did not find the Note and
Deed of Trust were latently ambiguous based on “perceived unfairness.” Mark’s Brief at 13;
Jennifer’s Br. at 11-12. But that was the substance of the district court’s rationale. It found the
Note and Deed of Trust were latently ambiguous because the principal amount of the Note was
more than double the amount Mark and Jennifer need to purchase the Hayden Lake house. R.
472. The district court also believed that the contracts do not reflect the parties’ entire agreement
“because the Note and Deed of Trust, on their face, do not make sense.” R. 472.
That is no different than the argument the landowner made in Knipe Land, whether the
result is described as “absurd” or “unfair,” or one that “do[es] not make sense.” To be sure, in
Knipe Land the alleged latent ambiguity was not tied to any particular language that was
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rendered uncertain by the facts of the case or that needed further explanation. 151 Idaho at 456,
259 P.3d at 602. The Court found the resulting “absurdity” was not akin to the absurdity found in
Cool (if “swimming” had been strictly interpreted). Id. That is the situation here too.
d.

The Note and Deed of Trust are not latently ambiguous.

Here too the perceived absurdity does not suggest that the parties intended the Note and
Deed of Trust to mean anything other than what the contracts plainly say. The Note and Deed of
Trust were essential to the transaction. Mark and Jennifer had no way to acquire the money they
needed to purchase the Hayden Lake house without signing them. See COE 608 (Ex. E). The
Note is evidence of that debt and contains Mark and Jennifer’s absolute promise to pay a
specified amount, at a specified time:
For value received, the undersigned (“Maker”), jointly and
severally, promise to pay to the order of Anthony J. Porcello and
Annie C. Porcello, husband and wife (“Holder”), the principal sum
of Six Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and
No Cents ($648,500.00) in lawful money of the United States of
America with interest thereon …. The entire balance of $648,500
shall also be payable on November 29, 2014.
COE 609 (Ex. F). The Deed of Trust expressly secures that obligation, plus “all such further
sums as may hereafter be loaned or advanced by the Beneficiary” to either Mark or Jennifer
while they owed the Hayden Lake house. COE 610 (Ex. G).
There is only one reasonable interpretation of a promise to pay the principal of $648,500
with interest: a promise to pay the principal sum of $648,500 with interest. The natural and only
implication of Mark and Jennifer’s agreement is an absolute promise to pay. In the Note and
Deed of Trust, Mark and Jennifer bound themselves to pay $648,500, plus interest, secured by
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the Deed of Trust. They also agreed that the Deed of Trust would secure future advances while
they owed the Hayden Lake house. As a result, the Note and the Deed of Trust must be given
their plain meaning. See Knipe Land, 151 Idaho at 456, 259 P.3d at 602.
2.

In violation of the parol evidence rule, the district court considered extrinsic
evidence to explain a perceived ambiguity in the Note and Deed of Trust
without tying the evidence to any particular term.

In their opening brief (at pp. 32-34), Annie and Tony also explained that there is another
way to demonstrate the district court’s error in finding the Note and Deed of Trust were latently
ambiguous: the extrinsic evidence the district court considered did not interpret or explain the
meaning of any uncertain term but, instead, materially altered the contracts to include entirely
new terms. In interpreting the Note and Deed of Trust, that violated the parol evidence rule. The
parol evidence rule holds that once the parties have reached a final written agreement, their prior
or contemporaneous understandings, negotiations, and agreements are ineffective, immaterial,
and incompetent to vary, contradict, or enlarge the written contract. Valley Bank v. Christensen,
119 Idaho 496, 498, 808 P.2d 415, 417 (1991).
a.

Annie and Tony raised the use of parol evidence to interpret the
contracts as a substantive issue, and the district court considered it
and interpreted the contracts to include new conditions.

Jennifer contends that Annie and Tony waived their argument that extrinsic evidence
cannot be used to add new terms to the Note and Deed of Trust by failing to object to the
admission of extrinsic evidence at trial. Jennifer’s Br. at 5-6, 12-13. Jennifer is wrong. Annie and
Tony do not assign error to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence but to the district court’s
failure to correctly apply substantive law to the facts before it. See Annie and Tony’s Opening
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received such widespread recognition that

(emphasis omitted».
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objection is interposed at trial”); Bulis v. Wells, 565 P.2d 487, 490 (Wyo. 1977) (“We
acknowledge, of course, that the parol-evidence rule is one of substantive law and must be
applied even where testimony is admitted without objection.” (citation omitted)); Gajewski v.
Bratcher, 221 N.W.2d 614, 629 (N.D. 1974) (“[S]ince parol evidence is not a rule of evidence
but of substantive law, the failure to make proper and timely objection to the admissibility of oral
or intrinsic evidence does not render such evidence competent or admissible or entitle it to any
probative force or value, and imposes a duty upon the appellate courts to disregard and to
exclude such evidence from its consideration in the rendition of its decision ….”).
Further, to properly preserve an issue for appellate review, “both the issue and the party’s
position on the issue must be raised before the trial court.” State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99,
439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). Annie and Tony did so here. On summary judgment, they argued
“that the Note and Deed of Trust are complete agreements and that parol evidence cannot be
considered to alter the terms of unambiguous agreements.” R. 208. Likewise at trial, they argued
that the Note and Deed of Trust were unambiguous, were not susceptible to another reasonable
interpretation, and must be interpreted and construed according to their plain terms. R. 380-81,
387, 436. Both Jennifer and the district court specifically addressed those issues.
In her closing reply argument, Jennifer addressed “Defendants’ arguments for application
of the Parol Evidence Rule to the Note and Deed of Trust,” citing the district court’s order
denying summary judgment, and incorporated the district court’s “reasoned analysis” by
reference and asked the district court to “reject those arguments once again.” R. 408 (emphases
added). Of course the district court did. After reciting substantive rules on contractual
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interpretation, R. 471, the district court found a latent ambiguity in the Note and Deed of Trust
and, therefore, that it was appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence “to determine the parties’
intent at the time the Note and Deed of Trust were signed” and “to interpret the Note and Deed
of Trust based on” the perceived latent ambiguity, R. 472-73.
The district court then concluded the parties intended that Mark and Jennifer’s obligation
under the Note and Deed of Trust would be satisfied when the Woodinville house was sold and
the Legacy Group loan was repaid. R. 473, 477. Because the parol evidence rule was addressed
to and decided by the district court, Kraly v. Kraly, 147 Idaho 299, 208 P.3d 281 (2009) does not
apply. See Jennifer’s Br. at 6. In Kraly, the Court refused to consider whether parol evidence was
properly admitted because there was no objection raised at trial. 147 Idaho 299, 302–03, 208
P.3d 281, 284–85 (“We will not consider issues pertaining to the admission of evidence where
no objection was raised to admission at trial.”). Unlike in Kraly, the district court had the
opportunity to address the same issue that is raised here.
Moreover, below, Jennifer did not raise her position that the failure to object to the
admission of extrinsic evidence constitutes a waiver of the parol evidence rule. Rather, as just
shown, the parties and the district court debated the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret and
modify the Note and Deed of Trust, despite the receipt of the evidence. Jennifer argued, just as
Annie, Tony, and Mark did, the legal sufficiency of the extrinsic evidence and its meaning and
effect on the terms of the Note and Deed of Trust. Thus, the parties, by their actions, addressed
extrinsic evidence as an issue of substantive law, not evidence. Jennifer cannot now complain
that Annie and Tony should have objected to the admission of parol evidence. See City of
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Middleton v. Coleman Homes, LLC, 163 Idaho 716, 727, 418 P.3d 1225, 1236 (2018) (holding
party cannot assert error when party’s own conduct induces the commission of the error).
b.

The district court made no findings or conclusions on whether the
Note and Deed of Trust were induced by fraud or completely or
partially integrated.

Jennifer and Mark also argue the parol evidence rule has no application here because of
other exceptions to the rule, such as where fraud is alleged or where the writing is not integrated.
See Jennifer’s Brief at 6-8, 12-19; Mark’s Brief at 11. The fundamental problem with those
arguments is that the district court did not justify its use of extrinsic evidence based on those
reasons. See R. 471-473. The district court was clear that it sought to interpret the Note and Deed
of Trust to resolve a perceived latent ambiguity and determine the parties’ intent. See R. 471477. It did not find the contracts void or voidable or that the parties entered into a collateral
agreement. See id.
Thus, the record does not support Jennifer’s contentions that the district court was
justified in considering parol evidence based on fraud in the inducement. See Jennifer’s Br. at 6,
15-19. While “the parol evidence rule has nothing to do with a case where the defense is fraud in
procuring the agreement,” Utils. Eng’g Inst. v. Criddle, 65 Idaho 201, 141 P.2d 981, 985 (1943),
the district court made no factual finding or legal conclusion on alleged fraudulent efforts to
induce Jennifer to sign the Note and Deed of Trust. R. 453-78. It would be improper for the
Court to do so now. See Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L.L.C., 138 Idaho 27, 31, 56 P.3d
1277, 1281 (2002). (refusing to address a fraud allegation on appeal and whether the elements of
fraud had been proven because the district court had not addressed the issue).
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The district court also did not justify its use of extrinsic evidence because the Note and
Deed of Trust were unintegrated. See R. 471-473. The parol evidence rule does not apply where
the writing is not integrated. Valley Bank, 119 Idaho at 498, 808 P.2d at 417. Jennifer places
great emphasis on the district court’s finding that “[i]t is clear that the Note and Deed of Trust do
not reflect the entire agreement of the parties because the Note and Deed of Trust, on their face,
do not make sense.” R. 472; Jennifer’s Br. at 7-8, 12. But that was all the district court said. The
district court made no determination on whether the Note and Deed of Trust were completely or
partially integrated. See R. 471-477.
An integrated agreement is a writing constituting a final statement on a subject. See
Nysingh v. Warren, 94 Idaho 384, 385, 488 P.2d 355, 356 (1971). A writing can be partially
integrated if it is exhaustive on a limited subject. Id. Whether a particular subject of negotiations
is embodied in the writing depends on the intent of the parties, revealed by their conduct and
language, and by the surrounding circumstances. Id. In Nysingh, for example, the Court
determined a note was not integrated because it did not refer to two crucial portions of the
parties’ agreement. Id. The district court engaged in no such analysis here. See R. 471-477. It
made no finding of the parties’ intent related to integration. It only found the Note and Deed of
Trust did not make sense, when in fact their plain language did.
To the extent Jennifer argues fraud and lack of the integration are grounds for the Court
to apply the “right result, wrong theory” rule and find no error in the district court’s
interpretation of the Note and Deed of Trust, that is not correct. The rule does not authorize the
Court to uphold a particular result by engaging in appellate fact-finding upon conflicting
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evidence. See Schraufnagel v. Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753, 756, 747 P.2d 775, 778 (Ct. App.
1987) (refusing to apply alternative theory where Court was asked to address host of factual and
legal issues for first time on appeal), disapproved on other grounds by Golay v. Loomis, 118
Idaho 387, 797 P.2d 95 (1990). As explained, the Court would be required to do so here.
c.

Purporting to interpret the Note and Deed of Trust, the district court
cannot consider extrinsic evidence to add entirely new conditions that
the parties themselves omitted.

Even if the district court’s consideration of extrinsic evidence was proper, it erred in
using that evidence as a basis for adding absent terms rather than as a tool for interpreting and
explaining the Note and Deed of Trust’s existing language. Contrary to Mark and Jennifer’s
position, the extrinsic evidence the district court relied on did not reveal the contracts are
reasonable susceptible to terms that allowed them to take the Hayden Lake house “free and
clear” once the Woodinville house sold and the Legacy Group loan was repaid. Mark’s Br. at 1315; Jennifer’s Br. at 6-7, 12. More directly, Mark and Jennifer’s disputed conversation with Joe
Mijich did not demonstrate an ambiguity in the contracts.
As shown in Snoderly, Williams, and Cool, the offered extrinsic evidence must be
relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the contract is reasonably susceptible. In
other words, the extrinsic evidence must be tethered to a particular term or language. But the
extrinsic evidence Mark and Jennifer introduced was not offered to explain or clarify any
particular term or language of the Note and Deed of Trust but to add terms that do not exist in the
writings. There is no dispute that the express terms of the contracts do not release Mark and
Jennifer from their obligations once the Woodinville house sold and the Legacy Group loan was
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repaid. As such, the district court should have ignored the extrinsic evidence. Snoderly, 30 Idaho
at 488, 166 P. at 265-66; see also Matter of Estate of Kirk, 127 Idaho 817, 824, 907 P.2d 794,
801 (1995) (“Parol evidence may be considered to aid a trial court in determining the intent of
the drafter of a document if an ambiguity exists.”).
In sum, while purporting to interpret the Note and Deed of Trust, the district court
improperly subjected the parties to a contract that was not expressed in their writing. The district
court’s authority when construing a contract is limited. It cannot modify the contract to create a
new agreement and cannot “revise an agreement where its interpretation is involved.” McCallum
v. Campbell-Simpson Motor Co., 82 Idaho 160, 166, 349 P.2d 986, 990 (1960). It cannot make
better agreements for the parties than they made themselves. Id. “[N]or can courts interpret an
agreement to mean something the contract does not itself contain.” Id. But here the district court
interpreted the Note and Deed of Trust to include terms that do not exist.
3.

Idaho Code § 28-3-117 does not allow the district court to interpret and add
conditions to the Note and Deed of Trust with parol evidence.

According to Mark, Idaho Code § 28-3-117 allows the courts to “utilize other agreements
when interpreting such an instruction.” Mark’s Br. at 11. While the district court held the same
view, see R. 472 (“the UCC provides that other agreements may be considered when interpreting
a negotiable instrument.”), they both are mistaken. As Annie and Tony explained in their
opening brief (at pp. 34-36), Section 28-3-117 is subject to the parol evidence rule and does not
concern the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret an ambiguous negotiable instrument per se.
Rather the statute recognizes that an instrument “may be modified, supplemented or nullified by
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a separate agreement of the obligor and a person entitled to enforce the instrument.” Idaho Code
§ 28-3-117. The district court made no findings that the parties entered into a separate agreement
and undertook no such analysis. See R. 472-473. To be sure, it never addressed whether a
subsequent agreement complied with the requirements of a valid contract. See id.
Despite or in light of that, Jennifer contends that Section 28-3-117 is the codification of a
common law contract principle, namely that “[f]raud in the inducement is always admissible to
show that representations by one party were a material part of the bargain.” Jennifer’s Br. at 1516 (citing Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 402, 690 P.2d 333, 337 (1984)). Based on that
contention, Jennifer argues that the Note was modified based on Joe Mijich’s fraudulent
representations to Mark and Jennifer. Id. at 16-19. Jennifer’s argument suffers from the same
problem as noted before. The district court did not consider fraud or make any findings on fraud.
R. 453-78. Because the district court did not address Jennifer’s argument, there is nothing for the
Court to review. See Gillespie, 138 Idaho at 31, 56 P.3d at 1281.
In any event, for that same reason, the Court is unable to apply the “right result, wrong
theory” rule with respect to the district court’s application of Section 28-3-117. See
Schraufnagel, 113 Idaho at 756, 747 P.2d at 778. Too many factual and legal issues remain to
apply the statute differently. Moreover, “if a decision, taken as a whole, appears to reflect a
misapprehension of law, proper appellate response is to vacate the decision and to remand the
case for reconsideration in light of the proper legal framework.” Thrall v. St. Luke’s Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 157 Idaho 944, 947, 342 P.3d 656, 659 (2015). The district court’s decision misapplied the
law to interpret new terms into the Note and Deed of Trust and requires remand for the court to
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weigh the disputed facts and direct its findings according to the correct legal principles.
Lastly, even if the Court could find Joe Mijich’s statements to Mark and Jennifer were
sufficient to constitute a separate agreement, the statute of frauds precludes such a finding. See
Ogden v. Griffith, 149 Idaho 489, 493, 236 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2010) (“Because a deed of trust is
an interest in real property, it falls under the terms of I.C. § 9-503.”). Annie and Tony addressed
the statute of frauds at pages 36-37 of their opening brief. In response, Jennifer maintains that
they waived this issue because it was never raised to the district court. While Annie and Tony did
not raise this issue below, it is also true that the Joe Mijich’s statements were not considered by
the district court to form a separate agreement. Annie and Tony raised the issue only to the extent
Mark or Jennifer argues on appeal that the parties reached a collateral agreement modifying the
Note and Deed of Trust.
B.

The district court’s interpretation of the parties’ intent under the Note and Deed of
Trust is not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
In their opening brief, Annie and Tony explained why substantial and competent

evidence does not support the district court’s interpretation of the Note and Deed of Trust. See
Annie and Tony’s Br. at 38-44. The district court’s conclusion that the parties intended Mark and
Jennifer to take the Hayden Lake house “free and clear” once the Woodville house sold and the
Legacy Group loan was repaid is implausible based on the record. In particular, the record
simply does not support the district court’s belief that “Annie and Tony were not out-of-pocket
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on the Hayden transaction but borrowed money to allow Jennifer and Mark to purchase the
Hayden home” and “the loan Annie and Tony obtained was paid.” R. 477.
Those findings cannot be reconciled with another key finding made by the district court:
that Mark and Jennifer should receive $150,000 from the equity in the Woodinville house. See R.
465. That being the case, Annie and Tony were entitled to the rest. See id. But when all was said
and done, Annie and Tony received none of the equity in the Woodinville house and financed
three loans that allowed Mark and Jennifer to walk off with a house they did not pay for. Mark
and Jennifer presented no evidence that Annie and Tony meant to gift all their equity in the
Woodinville house, the $312,044 needed to purchase the Hayden Lake house, and all the loan
fees incurred to obtain and eventually pay off the Legacy Group loan. See Banner Life Ins. Co. v.
Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Tr., 147 Idaho 117, 126, 206 P.3d 481, 490 (2009) (essential
element of gift is a manifested intent to make gift).
Mark and Jennifer come up with different explanations to support the district court’s
interpretation of the Note and Deed of Trust and conclusion that the parties intended to forgive
the Note once the Legacy Group loan was repaid. According to Mark, that is shown because he
and Annie would have suffered a $40,000 net loss if the Woodinville house has sold as planned
(i.e., before the Second Evergreen loan). Mark’s Br. at 15. From there, Mark contends the
Second Evergreen loan covered that loss, plus the $312,044 loaned to Mark and Jennifer for the
Hayden Lake house, and that Annie and Tony were made whole because Mark pays the Second
Evergreen loan. Id. Jennifer simply argues that Tony and Annie received $150,000 when the
Woodinville house sold. Jennifer’s Br. at 20.
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Mark and Jennifer’s explanation is contradicted by the trial court’s acknowledgment that
the Second Evergreen loan was all Mark’s and had no relation to the Legacy Group loan. R. 465466. As discussed earlier at p. 5, Mark testified that the Second Evergreen loan was unrelated to
the Hayden Lake house and the Legacy Group loan; it was needed to purchase the Bellevue
property, which is why he eventually received the Second Evergreen loan’s proceeds and
advances from Annie and Tony to replace the proceeds that were otherwise dispersed. See Tr.
181:21-183:3, 188:21-189:6, 191:17-192:5, 204:18-206:8, 241:9-244:18, 314:1-16, 413:9414:10, 1486:14-23 (Mark); COE 615 (Ex. N); COE 711 (Ex. AA). That included $116,494 in
proceeds from the loan, plus advancements of $52,382.07 and $157,157.40.
To the extent that Mark equates the sale of the Woodinville house to a loss of $40,000
and Jennifer claims that Annie and Tony made a $150,000 profit once the house was sold, they
completely ignore the fact that Annie and Tony were entitled to their share of the equity in the
Woodinville house, leveraged that equity (plus equity from the Via Vento house) to loan Mark
and Jennifer $312,044 to purchase the Hayden Lake house, and incurred substantial fees to close
the Legacy Group loan and eventually pay off that loan. Yet Annie and Tony did not receive a
penny of their equity or reimbursement for those fees. Annie and Tony’s opening brief explained
this, following the equity in the Woodinville house as it moved to the Legacy Group loan and the
Hayden Lake house. See Annie and Tony’s Br. at 40-44.
The simplest way to understand what Annie and Tony contributed to the purchase of the
Hayden Lake house is to consider the parties’ respective financial stake in the Woodinville house
if it sold for $690,000 before Annie and Tony obtained the Legacy Group loan. After selling fees
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(nearly $49,000) and paying off the first mortgage (just over $270,000), the equity in the house
would have been around $370,000. See id. According to the district court, Mark and Jennifer
were entitled to $150,000 of that, leaving $220,000 for Annie and Tony. See R. 465. Of course
that did not happen. The equity in the Woodinville house, together with the equity in the Via
Venito house, was used to obtain the $648,500 Legacy Group loan. R. 461. And because the
Legacy Group loan was eventually paid off through subsequent refinancing of both houses, the
district court found Annie and Tony were not out-of-pocket and were paid in full. R. 477
Using Annie and Tony’s $220,000 in equity as the focal point, where did that money go?
The district court was satisfied that the Legacy Group loan and the Note were identical, that the
parties anticipated the Woodinville house would be sold to pay off the Legacy Group loan, and
that the Legacy Group loan was eventually repaid. See R. 473-477. But those facts did not
account for Annie and Tony’s equity in the Woodinville house, for which they were not
compensated. See Annie and Tony’s Br. at 40-44. Nor can the facts be stretched to mean that
Annie and Tony intended to gift Mark and Jennifer all of that equity so they would own the
Hayden Lake house “free and clear” once the Legacy Group loan was paid. See id.
That is an implausible interpretation of the Note and Deed of Trust and an implausible
result. The Court should be left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
A reasonable trier of fact would not accept and rely on the findings made by the district court in
resolving the perceived ambiguity. If the Court finds the Note and Deed of Trust were latently
ambiguous, the district court’s determination of the parties’ intent should be reversed.
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C.

The district court erred in finding the Deed of Trust does not cover future advances.
As noted, the parties included an express future advance clause in the Deed of Trust.

COE 610 (Ex. G). Annie and Tony addressed the clause in their opening brief (at pp. 44-46) and
explained that the district court erred when it found the parties did not intend to secure
subsequent advances made to Mark and Jennifer while they owned the Hayden Lake house. See
R. 474-476. Future advance clauses are enforceable in Idaho, and the district court cannot simply
refuse to enforce it. See, e.g., Biersdorff v. Brumfield, 93 Idaho 569, 572, 468 P.2d 301, 304
(1970) (“[I]f the parties intended that there should be future advances secured by the mortgage,
that agreement protected the seniority of the lien for the subsequent advances.”).
1.

The district court ignored the parties’ express agreement to protect future
advances made for any purpose.

In response, Jennifer contends the evidence at trial supports the district court’s findings
that there was no creditable evidence of intent to cover future advances. Jennifer’s Br. at 20-22;
see also R. 475-476. Jennifer makes the same mistakes the district court did. She too relies on
Biersdorff for the proposition that there must be sufficient extrinsic evidence before a court will
enforce a future advance clause. See Jennifer’s Br. at 20-22. But Biersdorff concerned a
mortgage that made no reference to securing subsequent indebtedness. 93 Idaho at 571, 468 P.2d
at 303. Nonetheless, the district court found the parties intended to secure future advances by
oral agreement, and the Court affirmed and found that agreement enforceable. Id. at 572-73, 468
P.2d at 304-05.
Here, in contrast, there was an express contract to protect future advances, and it must be
enforced according to its terms, as in Farmers National Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d
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762 (1994). In Farmers National Bank, the Court held that a security agreement secured future
advances where it granted a security interest “to secure payment and performance of the
liabilities and obligations of Debtor to Secured Party of every kind and description ... due or to
become due, now existing or hereafter arising.” 126 Idaho at 73, 878 P.2d at 772. The future
advance clause in the Deed of Trust is even more explicit. Not only did the parties agree to
secure payment of the Note, they agreed
to secure payment of all such further sums as may hereafter be
loaned or advanced by the Beneficiary herein to the Grantor
herein, or any or either of them, while record owner of present
interest, for any purpose, and of any notes, drafts or other
instruments representing such further loans, advances or
expenditures together with interest on all such sums at the rate
therein provided … it is the express intention of the parties to this
Deed of Trust that is shall stand as continuing security until paid
for all such advances together with interest thereon.
COE 610 (Ex. G) (emphases added). Thus the Deed of Trust expressly provides security for all
future loans or advancements made by Annie and Tony, for any purpose, while Mark and
Jennifer own the Hayden Lake house.
In the face of that express agreement, the district court cannot ignore it. The district court
should have considered the money Annie and Tony advanced to Mark and Jennifer while they
owned the Hayden Lake house and while they were married to determine their debt. See, e.g., R.
465-466 (finding Annie and Tony advanced further sums to Mark and obtained the Evergreen
loans to pay the Legacy Group loan). It does not matter that the district court viewed future
advances to refinance the Legacy Group loan or other properties as unrelated to the Note. See R.
475-476. As with its interpretation of the Note, the district court improperly relied on extrinsic
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evidence without identifying any ambiguous language and justified its analysis because the
agreement does not make sense. See id.
Because the Deed of Trust secured the subsequent advances made to Mark and Jennifer,
the district court erred in refusing to consider those amounts in determining whether Annie and
Tony could foreclose on the Hayden Lake house.
2.

Whether the Deed of Trust secured future advances was raised and decided.

In addition, Jennifer cites the district court’s statement that Annie and Tony failed to
develop the future advance argument other than to argue that Mark and Jennifer failed to satisfy
the terms of the Note and Deed of Trust. See Jennifer’s Br. at 18, 22 (citing R. 476). The district
court did not support the statement or reach a conclusion as to its impact. See R. 476. But to the
extent the district court questioned whether the future advance clause was properly before it, the
record shows Annie and Tony’s position was raised and rejected.
During the trial, Annie and Tony’s counsel addressed the future advance clause directly
to the district court and questioned witnesses on the clause and the sums advanced to Mark after
the Deed of Trust was executed and while he and Jennifer held the Hayden Lake house together.
See, e.g., Tr. 37:3-38:12, 289:13-290:13, 293:2-23 (counsel); Tr. 314:1-315:1, 355:23-356:1,
417:8-10, 422:16-425:22 (Mark); Tr. 967:13-968:17 (Parker); Tr. 1193:7-1194:1, 1201:241203:19, 1212:1-1213:8 (Kalyn). Jennifer’s counsel also raised questions about the clause. See
Tr. 996:2-998:18, 1008:17-1009:3 (Parker).
Annie and Tony also addressed the future advance clause and the advances Mark and
Jennifer owed in their closing argument. R. 394-399, 430-431. So did Jennifer. R. 371-372, 413-
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414. Thus the Deed of Trust’s future advance clause was raised and argued, and the district court
addressed it and ruled it had no effect on the foreclosure of the Deed of Trust. R. 474-476. As
with the parol evidence rule, the issue is properly before the Court on appeal. See Gonzalez, 165
Idaho at 99, 439 P.3d at 1271.
D.

Annie and Tony have not appealed the district court’s finding that Mark and
Jennifer are entitled to $150,000 in equity from the Woodinville house.
Jennifer raises an additional issue on appeal: whether she is entitled to a credit of

$150,000 if the Court finds sums are owed under the Note and Deed of Trust. See Jennifer’s Br.
4, 22. Annie and Tony explained in their opening brief (at pp. 10-12, 40) that the district court
found Mark and Jennifer are entitled to $150,000 in equity from the Woodinville house. See also
R. 464-465. Annie and Tony have not challenged that finding on appeal because Mark and Kalyn
each testified that Annie and Tony and Mark and Jennifer would share in the proceeds once the
house sold, based on their respective contributions. See Tr. 150:18-151:8, 1483:8-1484:2,
1485:1-6 (Mark); Tr. 1282:7-19, 1308:5-1309:4 (Kalyn).
Further there is substantial and competent evidence to support the district court’s findings
that the parties’ contributions were “roughly equal” and that Mark and Jennifer were entitled to
$150,000 from the equity in the Woodinville house once it sold. See R. 464-65. It follows then,
as noted, that Annie and Tony were equally entitled to their equity in the house. Mark and
Jennifer’s credit of $150,000 completely undermines the district court’s later conclusion that the
parties intended the Note to be forgiven and the Deed of Trust released simply because the
Woodinville house was sold and the Legacy Group loan was repaid.
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Whoever prevails 0n appeal

E.

Neither

Mark nor Jennifer

under the Note. See Mark’s Br.

is

entitled t0 costs

F). In addition,

prevail, they are also entitled to

would

The Note expressly

at 16; Jennifer’s Br. at 23.

if the

Note

is

collected

states that

by an

an award of attorney fee under the

statute, just as

COE

Mark and

be.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained, the Court should reverse the judgment of the
for the court t0 apply the

in default

attorney.

on a note 0r negotiable instrument. Should Annie and Tony

IV.

remand

Mark

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) allows the prevailing party reasonable attorney

fees in a civil action to recover

Jennifer

fees.

questions Annie and Tony’s right t0 attorney fees 0n appeal

and Jennifer must “pay a reasonable attorney’s fee”
609 (EX.

and attorney

Note and Deed of Trust

as written,

district court

and

ﬁnd Mark and Jennifer were

under the Note, and determine the amount owed by Mark and Jennifer.
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